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Identifying the cognitive processes underlying tacti-
cal decision making is vital for two purposes: (a) reduc-
ing risk through improved training and (b) facilitating the 
public’s attitudes toward the legitimacy of the police and 
criminal justice system. Despite this, very little research 
has been conducted into British police decision mak-
ing involving the use of firearms. This study begins to 
address this gap by examining the impact that exper-
tise has on British police’s use-of-force decisions during 
armed confrontations. To do so, the tactical decision-
making processes of 12 expert specialized firearms 
officers and 11 novice authorized firearms officers 
during armed confrontations were compared through 
cognitive task analysis methods. Data were coded via 
categories derived from theory and patterns inductively 
emergent within the data. The results found expert spe-
cialized firearms officers to be more flexible in adaptive 
responding to situational changes, while novice autho-
rized firearms officers reported a more sequential and 
linear process of tactical decision making. In identifying 
the key features of expertise within this environment 
(“adaptive flexibility”), this study has theoretical and 
practical implications for the acceleration of authorized 
firearms officers’ expertise acquisition to bridge the 
existing gap resulting from a lack of available qualified 
operational force commanders.
Keywords: police, UK, cognitive task analysis, critical 
decision method, naturalistic decision making
Use of lethal force by police officers lies at the 
extreme edge of policing activity (Burrows, 
2007). There is a fine line between the use of 
necessary force to achieve legitimate police 
objectives and the use of excessive force: When 
an officer uses force that may be considered 
excessive, public approval for police authority 
is shaken (MacDonald, Manz, Alpert, & 
Dunham, 2003). The salience of tactical deci-
sion making is evident in the incidents that 
attract widespread attention, evaluation, and 
criticism. For instance, the death of Mark 
Duggan, who was shot and killed by police in 
Tottenham, North London, sparked riots that 
spread across England in August 2011. 
However, the consequences of failing to act in 
circumstances that pose an imminent threat to 
life could be equally critical. Therefore, the 
performance of police firearms teams must be 
efficient and accurate (Kavanagh, 2006).
Nonetheless, a range of psychophysiologic 
and cognitive factors can influence the way in 
which authorized firearms officers (AFOs) 
 perform—many of which are not often taken 
into account while planning tactical operations 
and conducting the investigations that follow 
(Kavanagh, 2006; Thompson & Lee, 2004). 
External factors (e.g., suspect aggression; loca-
tion of suspects, victims, or officers; visual and 
physical cover; and a constant reappraisal of 
potential hazards) and internal factors (e.g., 
physiologic arousal) can interact with an AFO’s 
perception and appraisal of an environment 
(Klinger, 2006; White, 2001, 2003). For instance, 
officers are more likely to unholster and dis-
charge their weapons and to do so earlier and 
more often as a result of increased external 
demand (e.g., suspect aggression) and internal 
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demand (e.g., physiologic arousal; Doerner & 
Ho, 1994; Vrij & Dingemans, 1996; Vrij, van 
der Steen, & Koppelaar, 1994).
As British police officers are not routinely 
armed, the role of AFOs who are qualified to 
carry and use firearms in Britain is highly spe-
cialized. Out of the 126,818 full-time-equivalent 
police officers in the 43 police forces of England 
and Wales, only 5,875 (4.6%) are currently serv-
ing as AFOs (Home Office, 2015a, 2015b). 
AFOs must meet entry requirements including 
high levels of physical fitness to qualify for such 
a role (Association of Chief Police Officers 
[ACPO], 2011). Before they become operation-
ally active, AFOs complete a rigorous and 
assessed training package that includes weapon 
handling, shooting skills, less lethal options, tac-
tical procedures, and scenario-based training. 
After they are qualified as an AFO, they must 
complete refresher training and assessment for 
all tactics on a regular basis (24 month), during 
which failure results in the instant revocation of 
an AFO’s firearms license (ACPO, 2011).
British AFOs are deployed only to incidents 
in which there is a perceived threat to life 
(ACPO, 2011). Circumstances that qualify for 
AFO deployment typically involve a “reason to 
suppose” that the attending officer may have to 
protect the public or oneself from a person who 
is in possession of, or has immediate access to, a 
firearm or potentially lethal weapon (College of 
Policing, 2013). Deployment can be issued by a 
strategic firearms commander or an accredited 
tactical firearms commander or through self-
deployment. An AFO can self-deploy upon 
encountering a situation where one believes that 
delay in seeking authority would be detrimental 
to public or officer safety.
Specialized firearms officers (SFOs) are a 
specialized group of AFOs who are trained in 
skills such as (a) hostage rescue, (b) specialist 
weapon and equipment use, (c) complicated 
methods of entry, and (d) prehospital trauma life 
support. SFOs volunteer themselves for the role, 
and upon initial approval by way of a rigorous 
5-day assessment, they follow a prolonged train-
ing program (18–19 weeks). SFOs receive 
refresher training every 6 weeks. Incidents dealt 
with by SFOs are deemed too dangerous for 
standard AFO response. These incidents often 
involve suspects who are mentally or  emotionally 
distressed, are under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, do not have clear goals, and resist attempts 
by others to resolve the situation. To conclude 
these incidents without incurring loss of life, 
high levels of training, skill, and operational 
expertise are required.
Klein’s (1997) recognition primed decision 
(RPD) model (Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 
2001) suggests that an expert recognizes critical 
environmental cues that trigger analogues (i.e., 
previously encountered similar experiences). 
This activation is thought to support decision 
making and reduce associated cognitive demand 
by focusing attention and integrating related 
information (Fiore, Ross, & Jentsch, 2012; Love-
day, Wiggins, Searle, Festa, & Schell, 2013). 
Recognition aids identification, evaluation, and 
implementation of action through reproduction 
of a previously utilized solution or through more 
complicated mental simulation and evaluation of 
potential options and associated outcomes.
Under the dynamic, ambiguous, and critical 
demands of an armed confrontation, officers will 
need “adaptive expertise” to cognitively and 
behaviorally adapt to unpredicted and dynamic 
events (Kozlowski & DeShon, 2004; Mercier & 
Higgins, 2013). Adaptive expertise refers to 
understanding when and why particular proce-
dures are appropriate or inappropriate and recog-
nizing shifts in the situation that necessitate 
adaptability (Wiltshire et al., 2014). Adaptability 
can therefore be described as an initiated behav-
ioral sequence triggered by recognition of an 
environmental cue suggesting that a change in 
tactical decision making should occur (Fiore 
et al., 2012; Verschaffel et al., 2009). This recog-
nition depends on conceptual understanding of 
cause–effect connections (insight) and the restruc-
turing of initial mental models (Fackler et al., 
2009; Klein & Jarosz, 2011).
Rasmussen’s (1976) decision ladder also pos-
its flexibility and adaptation as the defining 
 characteristics of expert decision making. The 
decision ladder comprises links between 
 information-processing activities and resulting 
states of knowledge. Whereas a rational, knowl-
edge-based, and linear behavior sequence is typi-
cally associated with novice task performance, 
experts are thought to flexibly shunt from one 
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process to the next and automatically execute pre-
set skill-based responses depending on the situa-
tional assessment (Jenkins, 2009; Naikar, 2010).
The purpose of this study was to explore 
expert tactical decision making during armed 
confrontations. Despite its critical role in effec-
tive policing, little research has been conducted 
into AFO expertise and decision making (Flin, 
Pender, Wujec, Grant, & Stewart, 2007; Kilner 
& Hall, 2005). This knowledge gap reflects dif-
ficulties gaining access to police samples, as 
well as challenges in the collection and analysis 
of police data that are ecologically valid and sci-
entifically objective. Identifying how tactical 
decisions are made and how expertise influences 
this process is vital for reducing risk within these 
complex and demanding situations and environ-
ments through training. The acceleration of 
expertise is critical owing to a lack of AFOs who 
were qualified as operational force commanders 
(OFCs) at the time that the current study was 
conducted (2013), potentially leading to non-
OFC-qualified AFOs being required to lead 
operations in their absence.
Although some authors have attempted to 
establish models of police decision making amid 
firearms incidents, these models are often 
framed in terms of the outcomes of armed con-
frontations, neglecting the importance of the 
antecedents of the shoot–no shoot decision in 
determining outcome and rarely exploring the 
importance of expertise (Amendola, 1995, 1996; 
Binder & Scharf, 1980; Terrill, 2005). Further-
more, current models of firearms decision mak-
ing among police are typically developed with 
routinely armed police forces (e.g., United 
States) and therefore almost certainly lack eco-
logic validity to nonroutinely armed forces (e.g., 
United Kingdom; Barton, Vrij, & Bull, 2002; 
Knutsson & Strype, 2003).
In identifying the cognitive processes under-
lying expert tactical decision making, this study 
highlights skills found to be most appropriate 
and successful in British police firearms domains, 
and as a result, instructors can concentrate their 
training accordingly (Klein & Militello, 2001; 
WBI Evaluation Group, 2007). In other profes-
sions requiring rapid decision making in risky 
environments, there has been significant research 
to understand and train operational thinking 
skills—for example, aviation (Orasanu & 
Fischer, 1997; Seamster et al., 1993) and prehos-
pital/medical emergency (Gunnarsson & Stom-
berg, 2009; Wong & Blandford, 2002).
ReseaRch appRoach
This exploratory study employed cognitive 
task analysis (CTA) methods to examine the 
expert decision making of British firearms 
officers during armed confrontations. CTA is 
a set of methods used to identify and explain 
the “mental processes involved in performing 
a task” (Klein & Militello, 2001, p. 163) that is 
cognitively complex (i.e., requiring an extensive 
knowledge base, complex inferences, and judg-
ment) and that takes place in a naturalistic envi-
ronment (O’Hare, Wiggins, Williams, & Wong, 
1998). Because AFOs are required to make 
decisions under high levels of uncertainty, time 
pressure, and risk, this sample is considered to 
serve as a paradigmatic example of naturalistic 
decision making at work (Roth et al., 2010). As 
such, CTA methods were selected as the most 
appropriate approach for generating insight and 
understanding about cognition in this real-world 
context (Crandall, Klein, & Hoffman, 2006; 
Tofelgrehl & Feldon, 2013).
CTA has been found to successfully support 
system operation and aid improvement through 
the development of effective training recom-
mendations in many various domains (Prasanna, 
Yang, & King, 2009), including military and 
defense operations (Riley, Endsley, Bolstad, & 
Cuevas, 2006), aviation (Endsley & Robertson, 
2002), and air traffic control (Endsley & Rodg-
ers, 1994). The results of these CTA studies 
identified which processes were most important, 
therefore ensuring their support of improved 
performance (Adams et al., 2009; Crandall et al., 
2006; Tofelgrehl & Feldon, 2013).
Successful CTA should progress through a 
number of stages (Clark, Feldon, van Merriën-
boer, Yates, & Early, 2008; Hoffman, Crandall, 
& Klein, 2008), proceeding from preparatory 
steps to knowledge elicitation, data analysis, and, 
finally, knowledge representation (Yusoff & 
Salim, 2012). Through consideration of the avail-
able CTA knowledge elicitation techniques, it 
was decided that the critical decision method (CDM) 
interview protocol would be most  suitable to 
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 retrospectively examine the tactical decision-
making processes of AFOs and SFOs during a 
previous firearms incident that they considered 
to be nonroutine. The CDM (Crandall et al., 
2006; Hoffman et al., 2008) is structured as an 
intensive incident-based interview protocol that 
aims to identify the decision-making processes 
involved in the judgments made during a person-
ally experienced “challenging” incident.
The CDM interview is a multistage process 
that utilizes multiple “sweeps” through an inci-
dent. These sweeps build in intensity—from 
brief and general incident recall to an intensive 
examination guided by the creation of a visual 
timeline, identification of decision points, and 
subsequent probing and hypothetical question-
ing regarding those decision points (Hoffman, 
Crandall, & Shadbolt, 1998; Klein & Militello, 
2001).
ReseaRch objective
The objectives of this research were to iden-
tify the exemplifying characteristics of expert 
decisional processes involved in the decision 
making of British firearms officers during armed 
confrontations to identify potential training rec-
ommendations and serve as guidance for empiri-
cal evaluation. Although we propose our find-
ings as instructional strategies, we acknowledge 
that future experimental research will need to be 
conducted to establish the effectiveness of these 
strategies. CTA qualitative research methods 
can generate meaningfully informed hypotheses 
suited to subsequent empirical testing (Crandall 
et al., 2006; Wiltshire et al., 2014). For the pres-
ent purposes, CTA methods are used as explor-
atory means to derive an integrated theoretical 
framework, which can then be tested empirically 
in traditional settings in future studies.
Method
participants
Twenty-three firearms officers voluntarily 
participated in this study, representing 20% 
of the AFOs in Merseyside Police. All were 
nationally accredited AFOs in the United King-
dom. This included 12 expert SFOs (all men) 
and 11 novice AFOs (9 men, 2 women). This 
sample size exceeds many CTA studies, which 
are typically small (n < 10) owing to the large 
amounts of qualitative data generated by these 
approaches and to the limited access to experts 
of specific fields of interest (see Crandall et al., 
2006; Wiltshire et al., 2014). The mean age 
of the expert SFOs was 46 years (SD = 5.09), 
and their length of service as firearms officers 
ranged from 7 to 21 years, with a mean and 
median of 17 years (SD = 3.63). The mean age 
of the novice AFOs was 32 years (SD = 4.59), 
and their length of service as a firearms officers 
ranged from 10 to 48 months, with a mean 
and median of 23 months (SD = 13.43) and 21 
months, respectively. Data are not available in 
the public domain to determine the representa-
tiveness of the sample in terms of age and sex. 
Prior to data collection, ethical approval was 
gained, and each participant signed informed 
consent.
Based on the assumption that expertise is 
characterized by specialized skills or knowledge 
derived from extensive experience with a 
domain (Crandall et al., 2006), the level of 
expertise required for this investigation was 
SFO-qualified participants with at least 10 years’ 
experience working as firearms officers. In con-
trast, to align with the statement that novices 
should have “minimal exposure to the domain” 
(Hoffman et al., 2008), novice AFOs were cho-
sen on the basis of having qualified as an AFO 
and therefore being competent enough to have 
done so and to subsequently have enough expe-
rience to be able to complete the CDM process 
but having ≤3 years’ experience as firearms offi-
cers (relative novice status in comparison with 
expert sample). Only 1 participant in the novice 
AFO group was qualified as an OFC and SFO; 
the rest had qualified as AFO only.
Materials
To conduct the analysis, permission was 
sought to record the knowledge elicitation ses-
sions in audio format via multiple Dictaphones 
(ALBA digital voice recorder and MP3 player: 
model number T858): one on the lapel of the ana-
lyst, one on the lapel of the participant, and one on 
the table of the room in which the interview was 
being conducted. The participant was informed 
of this procedure before signing consent forms. 
The interviews were guided by a script, and an 
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A3 blank-page pad was used to draw timelines 
of the recalled incidents. Qualitative data analysis 
software (NVivo 10; QSR International, 2013) 
assisted the analysis of the current studies and 
created a transparent and “auditable footprint” 
(Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012, p. 827).
procedure
Access was granted from the head of the fire-
arms department and the chief constable (ACPO 
level approval), but emphasis was placed on the 
importance of officer anonymity. To protect ano-
nymity, the demographic information collected 
was kept to a bare minimum, and participant 
numbers were used throughout analysis. Data 
collection consisted of knowledge elicitation 
sessions via the CDM. Through the CDM script, 
each participant was asked to walk through a 
“challenging” and nonroutine armed confronta-
tion that he or she personally experienced as an 
AFO. The CDM interviews were conducted in 
the officers’ workplace. Each interview lasted 
between 1 and 2 hours.
data analysis
All knowledge elicitation session audio 
recordings were transcribed. The transcripts 
were reviewed for accuracy immediately after 
collection, utilizing interview notes, timelines, 
and any other drawings or notations, to ensure 
quality control of the final transcript and to iden-
tify any discrepancies. For the current study, the 
data analysis reflected a framework analysis 
methodology, which allowed for both a “top-
down” (theory-driven) approach and a “bottom-
up” (data-driven) identification of emergent 
patterns (Wiltshire et al., 2014).
First, the data set was read multiple times and 
cognitive issues that appeared to be relevant to 
the analysis were considered; repeated ideas 
were also noted to gain insight and to evaluate 
the data set (Crandall et al., 2006). The 23 inter-
view transcripts were then inductively coded for 
repeated ideas, which were reviewed and 
grouped into themes and subthemes. This pro-
cess was iterative and involved multiple code 
and theme revisions. Summaries of the themes, 
subthemes, and supportive narrative are pre-
sented in Table 1.
Data from the interview transcripts and field 
notes were consolidated into a decision require-
ments table (DRT) to represent key decisions 
(see Table 2). The DRT was used to document 
and organize recalled cues (a sensory signal), 
information, strategies, and practices associated 
with expertise, as well as to identify specific 
challenges, potential pitfalls, and errors typi-
cally associated with inexperience. The DRT 
helped to synthesize and integrate the data across 
the 12 recalled incidents from expert SFOs and 
the 11 recalled incidents from novice AFOs, 
revealing overall key trends (Crandall et al., 
2006).
Quality control procedures
To demonstrate the objectivity of the research 
method, analysis, and conclusions, qualitative 
assessments were tested for interrater reliability 
to quantify the level of consistency between two 
independent raters who coded 30% of the data. 
The percentage of direct agreement for initial 
independent coding of the data was 62%, and 
Cohen’s kappa coefficient was .71 (range across 
transcripts: κ = .48–.83). Based on criteria set 
forth by Banerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney, and 
Sinha (1999), a kappa coefficient of .71 repre-
sents a fair level of agreement beyond that due 
to chance. Instances of disagreement between 
raters were discussed, and the coding system 
was adapted accordingly. The percentage of 
direct agreement for the reconciled coding was 
92%, and Cohen’s kappa coefficient was .89 
(range across transcripts: κ = .83–.97). Based 
on the criteria of Banerjee and colleagues, the 
reconciled coding had a substantial level of 
agreement beyond that due to chance.
Results
incident demographics
Out of the 12 SFOs interviewed, 9 (75%) 
recalled spontaneous incidents to which they 
were deployed or self-deployed while on armed 
response vehicle patrol. Two (17%) recalled 
incidents that, due to circumstantial factors, 
involved a rushed and partial deployment brief-
ing, and only one recalled a preplanned opera-
tion. Recalled incidents occurred between 2000 
and 2011. Eleven incidents involved contact 
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TABLE 1: Themes and Subthemes With Supportive Narratives From the Transcripts
Theme: Subtheme 
Officers referring  
to subtheme, n
Sample data extracts 
Expert  
SFOs
Novice  
AFOs
Experiential knowledge 
 Assumptions 8 4 We generally don’t run into fights with people 
who have various issues [mental health, 
alcohol or drugs] ’cause they’re more volatile 
and more prone to doing something that’s 
unexpected. (SFO2)
 Prototypes and  
 analogues
9a 6b Try your best to, to stop anything like that [7/7, 
9/11] happening, in your patch. (SFO10)
It took me back to the training course. (AFO3)
 Mental  
 modeling
11 11 I always try and preempt the “what if” factor . . . 
in a position where it’s not a surprise. (SFO4)
Try and cover any contingencies. . . .  
I was told when I first come down, when a 
job is coming in, give yourself hypothetical 
scenarios, what if, what if, what if. (AFO11)
 Typicality 11 9 You’ll pick up, as a result of the experience on 
any, er, anything that’s missing. (SFO8)
Every job is not the same but there are certain 
aspects of it that you always look for. (AFO9)
 Intuition 10 5 You could tell straight away . . . you get a bit of a 
feeling for a job. (SFO1)
A sixth sense. (AFO7)
 Shared situational  
 awareness
8 0 Everyone had the same mind-set. (SFO7)
Strategies  
 Control 11 1 Hadn’t put my blue’s and two’s on because I 
didn’t want to alert the suspects . . . didn’t 
want to give them any advantage on us, in 
preparing themselves to deal with armed 
police . . . a game of chess. (SFO11)
 Training mode 11 5 You go into a training mode . . . just tends to 
come automatically as a result of your training. 
(SFO8)
I actually, sort of reverting to type if you like and 
reverting to training. (AFO2)
 Chunking 6 0 You’re subconsciously prioritizing. . . . That’s 
borne out of years of experience. (SFO5)
Each stop was a separate little individual 
event. . . . You’re kind of ticking the boxes. 
(SFO11)
(continued)
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Theme: Subtheme 
Officers referring  
to subtheme, n
Sample data extracts 
Expert  
SFOs
Novice  
AFOs
Adaptation  
 Flexibility 12 4 The experience sort of made my decision making 
a lot quicker to say “Well I’m now not doing 
this role, I’m doing that role.” (SFO3)
Think on your feet and make a decision and look 
and be flexible. . . . Because of your training and 
experience it just kicks in to think, “No one’s 
there, I’ll go there and do my job there.” (SFO9)
 Confidence  9  5c I was very well trained. . . . Definitely the 
experience helped without a doubt. (SFO11)
As opposed to training, this was difficult for 
me. . . . I didn’t have the experience. . . . I was 
working out of my comfort zone. (AFO1)
Sought the opinion of someone who was at the 
back with me who had more experience. (AFO6)
Instead of, I suppose you could say asking 
permission I would probably say I think I 
should go here because of this . . . more 
confident in my own judgement. (AFO6)
 Defensive  
 adaptation
 8 1 It’s fight or flight isn’t it? . . . It’s survival. (SFO2)
I thought, “Oh, **** me, I’m gonna’ die.” . . . 
What it boiled down to was me or him. 
(SFO11)
Note. AFO, authorized firearms officer; SFO, specialized firearms officer.
aPrototype.
bAnalogue.
cSeeking verification.
TABLE 1: (continued)
with the suspects, and only one was resolved 
without direct engagement with a suspect. In 
this case, the suspect had already left the scene 
before police arrival; however, this informa-
tion was known only retrospectively; therefore, 
every incident recalled involved potential sus-
pect contact.
All 11 novice AFOs recalled spontaneous 
incidents to which they were either deployed by 
the force incident manager via the back-to-back 
radio transmission system or were self-deployed 
upon hearing the details of the incident through 
the radio while on armed response vehicle 
patrol. Two participants were required to act as 
the OFC during the recalled armed confronta-
tion; however, neither was formally trained to 
perform this role at the time of the incident 
(owing to a lack of qualified OFCs available to 
lead the operation). Both incidents were resolved 
with the security of a trained OFC available to 
verify the participants’ decisions; however, in 
both cases, the participant continued the role of 
OFC until the conclusion of the incident. Nine 
(82%) officers recalled an incident in which a 
contact with the suspect was encountered, 
whereas two (18%) recalled incidents that 
incurred no contact (i.e., suspect had already 
escaped before the police had arrived).
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TABLE 2: Decision Requirements Table
Phase
Decision challenge Cue/information Expert strategy/practice Novice traps
Prearrival
Spontaneous 
deployment, 
uncertainty, 
environmental 
challenges
Visual cues, audio 
intelligence feeds, 
suspect’s previous 
offenses or 
emotional/mental 
health/intoxication, 
previous knowledge 
of suspect/case
Situational awareness and 
assessment, instinct, 
assumptions, and 
expectations based on 
prototypes, predictive 
mental modeling, and 
contingency planning
Lack of previous 
knowledge to inform 
mental modeling, 
assumptions, and 
expectations
Arrival and contact
Ascertaining control 
over the situation
Visual assessment of 
the suspect (attitude, 
demeanor, likelihood 
of compliance)
Maintaining covert tactics 
for an advantage on 
the suspect, initial 
dominance/aggression, 
typicality, and anomaly 
recognition
Rushing in—lack 
of situational 
reassessment
Dynamic Fast-paced changes in 
environmental cues, 
suspect assessment, 
and intelligence
Tactical action based 
on training mode, 
adaptation, and 
flexibility aided by 
mental modeling and 
preparation
Defied expectations, 
reluctance to adapt
Situational limitations Lack of resources, 
equipment, or 
training
Adaptation, tactical 
dominance, shared 
situational awareness
Seeking verification, lack 
of confidence
Threat to life, contact, 
shoot–no shoot
Visual assessment of 
suspect aggression, 
presentation of a 
weapon, knowledge 
of suspect intent/
capability, increased 
physiologic arousal, 
and perceptual 
changes
Slowed perception—time 
to react, controlled 
adrenaline—faster 
reactions and stronger 
disposition, narrowed 
focus on hands (location 
of threat), cover, safety 
in numbers
Uncontrolled adrenaline 
response, speeded 
time—rushed and 
time-pressured 
decisions
Time pressure, 
responsibility
High speed, potential 
suspect escape
Best fit (fast response 
over optimal but timely 
decisions), chunking, 
predictive-consequence 
mental modeling
Tactics not yet conducted 
automatically—active 
analogue recall needed 
to guide action.
Postincident
Scene preservation, 
handover
Lack of pressure Standard operating 
procedures, hindsight, 
and hypotheticals
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Qualitative Results
The incidents described by expert SFOs 
and novice AFOs could be broadly split into 
three general phases: prearrival, arrival/contact 
(active involvement of tactical performance or 
contact with a suspect), and postincident (see 
Table 2). In general, expert SFO decisional 
processes were not consistently distinct across 
the phases in a linear manner but were instead 
applied flexibly throughout the armed confron-
tation. Expert SFO decision making was adap-
tive to circumstantial demands, leading to either 
an establishment of control and typicality or a 
“tipping point” of struggle for dominance and 
perceived time-critical threat to life that initi-
ated defensive behaviors. Compared with the 
flexible experiential decisions of expert SFOs, 
novice AFOs reported a more sequential and lin-
ear process of tactical decision making, which 
involved extended verbalizations and continued 
conscious processing throughout. Flexibility 
and adaptation to dynamic and time-pressured 
changes were therefore postulated by the SFOs 
to be the distinguishing feature of expertise in 
this context.
Our analysis generated four main themes with 
related subthemes that were relevant to the influ-
ence of expertise in decision making during 
armed confrontation. The details of these themes 
and related subthemes are discussed in turn, 
whereas examples and supportive narratives 
from the transcripts for each theme and subtheme 
are provided in Table 1. Together, these themes 
reflect the importance of adaptability to expertise 
in this context. In this sample, adaptive expertise 
reflects the flexible application of experiential 
knowledge, strategies, and skills with confidence 
in response to situational demands.
1. Experiential Knowledge. Whether declared 
explicitly or as a guiding force behind tactical 
confidence, all expert SFOs described their 
extensive firearms experience as a positive 
influence on their situational assessment and 
tactical decision making during the recalled 
incidents. The influence of SFO experiential 
knowledge was broadly described in the utiliza-
tion of assumptions and expectations that were 
mentally modeled on the basis of personal or 
working experiences. These assumptions and 
expectations identified typicality and anomalies 
in the current set of cues and indicated appropri-
ate tactical strategies based on this assessment. 
Such processes were often described as intui-
tive and were believed to be shared with their 
partners and team.
1a. Assumptions. The influence of SFO experi-
ential knowledge was broadly described in the 
utilization of assumptions regarding the unfold-
ing incident based on personal or working expe-
riences. Individual situational awareness of 
audio cues, visual cues, and intelligence feeds 
interacted with previous expectations to gener-
ate assumptions regarding incident legitimacy, 
suspect intention, and appropriate tactical 
action. In particular, intelligence feeds (e.g., ini-
tial report, background checks on the address, 
and suspect previous offenses and mental health 
history) informed assumptions of suspect inten-
tion and capability, which indicated expected 
tactical roles, responsibilities, and actions. 
These assumptions were predominantly influ-
ential during the five recalled incidents that 
involved suspects who were deemed to be emo-
tionally or mentally distressed and/or intoxi-
cated. The overall underlying concern when 
dealing with an emotionally or mentally dis-
tressed suspect was the potential negation of 
achieving compliance as a result of an assumed 
unpredictability and lack of rationality or rea-
soning. This is supported by previous reports 
acknowledging that the unpredictability of 
these suspects typically negate the assumption 
of rational compliance (Police Complaints 
Authority, 2003; Squires & Kennison, 2010). 
Therefore, additional tactical consideration, 
caution, and urgency were emphasized in these 
cases as a reflection of the increased risk associ-
ated with suspect unpredictability.
1b. Prototypes and Analogues. Supporting previ-
ous studies suggesting that experiences merge in 
memory with increasing expertise, nine expert 
SFOs used analogues nonspecifically as proto-
types rather than standout cases (Fackler et al., 
2009; O’Hare et al., 1998). These prototypes 
built assumptions regarding the suspect’s men-
tality, capability, and intent. In six cases, the sus-
pect was known to the SFO. This experience 
helped build strong assumptions and expecta-
tions regarding the suspect’s potential behavior.
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In contrast, six novice AFOs recalled utiliz-
ing specific analogues in their tactical decision 
making. For instance, analogues of training 
events in which a mistake was made were used 
as a reminder to be vigilant to potential error. 
Analogue recall was described as a visual pro-
cess; AFOs would picture themselves at an anal-
ogous scene of training, run through what hap-
pened in these scenarios, and marry up similari-
ties to guide predictions and preparation. One 
AFO recalled using past experiences as a “port-
folio of jobs” matched to the current context to 
identify appropriate tactical options (AFO9).
1c. Mental Modeling. Information received on 
deployment and any other further intelligence 
feeds interacted with officers’ models of typi-
cality, or “schemata” (Plant & Stanton, 2012; 
Plant, Stanton, & Harvey, 2013), to build men-
tal models of the unfolding events. Mental 
model refers to a representation of the core rela-
tionships within a domain based on conceptual 
knowledge and understanding (Wiltshire et al., 
2014). Mental models enabled officers to con-
sider potential tactical options and appropriate 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) in accor-
dance with projected events, and they initiated 
consideration and preparation of associated 
equipment (ballistic protection or weaponry).
Mental modeling was described by 11 expert 
SFOs as a preparatory process, which aided later 
adaptation (Klein & Militello, 2001; Pirolli & 
Card, 2005). Eleven expert SFOs used mental 
models to mentally simulate potential solutions 
and the associated outcomes to assess these 
options and adapt their behavior accordingly. 
This was formally acknowledged as “contin-
gency planning” and included physically prepar-
ing to deal with predicted events and outcomes 
(e.g., positioning self and equipment).
Predictive mental modeling was described as 
a preparatory skill developed over time based on 
previous knowledge, experience, and training. 
Nevertheless, all novice AFOs also described a 
process of mental modeling (i.e., “what if”), and 
for 10 novice AFOs, this involved mentally 
visualizing potential actions and “worst case” 
outcomes to prepare contingencies for such 
events. Expert SFOs and novice AFOs both 
described mental modeling as a visual process 
that directs choice; however, although expert 
SFOs exclusively discussed predictive mental 
modeling prearrival, AFOs reported mental 
modeling to be most influential on contact with 
a suspect.
1d. Typicality. By comparing environmental 
cues to schematic models of typicality, officers 
were able to either identify a match or recognize 
an anomaly. Identifying a match between cues 
and typicality triggered procedural knowledge 
and action known to be successful in previous 
analogous situations. In contrast, anomaly rec-
ognition heightened situational awareness to 
notice and address critical cues (Crandall et al., 
2006; Klein & Militello, 2001) and therefore 
was crucial to AFO/SFO tactical decision mak-
ing. Eleven expert SFOs reported that the abil-
ity to quickly recognize anomalies was 
accounted for by their experience. The most 
common and influential recognized anomaly 
was instances in which the suspect did not meet 
the officer’s expectations of compliance. As a 
deviation from typicality, noncompliance insti-
gated suspicion of the suspect’s intent.
1e. Intuition. AFOs’ development of expertise 
was emphasized in reports of intuitive assess-
ments regarding incident legitimacy, severity, 
address, and suspect identification. This was 
described as a skill that developed over time 
with experience. Expert SFOs reported having a 
“feel” for an incident, which helped them judge 
safety, priorities, and tactical decisions. Some 
novice AFOs also reported beginning to utilize 
intuition in this way (see Table 1). Expression 
of the incident “not being right” indicated intui-
tive anomaly recognition, triggering subsequent 
redirection of attention to focus on these anom-
alous features.
1f. Shared Situational Awareness. If afforded 
time to do so, individual situational awareness 
was verbally shared among team members to 
promote interteam coordinated responses. Team 
communication often reflected a prescribed 
script of routinely practiced verbal drills, which 
confirmed that an officer was currently con-
forming to tactical expectations. Nonetheless, 
eight expert SFOs described a lack of overt 
communication with the team during contact 
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with the suspect that reflected an implicit shared 
understanding and trust with the team. As a 
result of this shared understanding, eight expert 
SFOs said that they could make predictions 
regarding their colleagues’ actions and utilize 
these predictions to speed up their own response 
in support. This supports literature that identi-
fies expert team decision making in terms of 
shared cognition and shared mental models, 
which rely on a common knowledge base and 
aim (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001; Salas, 
Cooke, & Rosen, 2008; Sonesh, Rico, & Salas, 
2013). Furthermore, as an alternative to verbal 
discussion, expert SFOs sometimes established 
and exchanged visual communication with one 
another to ascertain their safety, shared knowl-
edge, and collaborative understanding. A lack 
of ability to establish this visual communication 
resulted in a sense of isolation and 
vulnerability.
2. Strategies. Experiential strategies included 
the active pursuit of control, a reliance on an 
automated “training mode,” and a process of 
“chunking” that involved compartmentalizing 
and prioritizing tasks.
2a. Control. Ascertaining a level of control over 
the incident was repeatedly reported by 11 
expert SFOs to be a prioritized aim. For expert 
SFOs, a lack of control reflected a lack of pre-
dictability, on which the likelihood of a success-
ful and safe conclusion was presumed to be 
reliant. Having sight of the suspects while 
working within a prescribed and familiar tactic 
enabled a greater sense of control. Ascertaining 
physical control of the suspects signaled an end 
of the immediate perceived threat and instigated 
postincident considerations.
To ascertain early incident control, expert 
SFOs initially used covert tactics. Covert meth-
ods allowed SFOs to be completely prepared to 
enforce a tactic within a highly controlled and 
rehearsed framework. By alerting the suspect to 
the ongoing police operation, six SFOs feared 
that “blowing the job” would give the suspect 
preparation and reaction time to escape or pose a 
lethal threat. Initial police dominance on arrival 
was reported by 10 expert SFOs as a method of 
establishing early compliance to ease the pres-
sure of the subsequent phases by negating 
unplanned, responsive, and therefore more risky 
methods and outcomes.
Whereas 11 expert SFOs heavily emphasized 
gaining and maintaining control as the strategy 
behind their tactical decisions, only one novice 
AFO discussed this. Yet, despite a lack of 
explicit discussion of this issue, novice AFOs 
did prioritize covert methods as a means to 
maintain an advantage over a suspect and to 
reduce the opportunity to escape.
2b. Training Mode. Through repeated practice, 
certain behaviors are automatically initiated in 
response to specific situational cues without 
conscious cognitive deliberation (Shachak, 
Hadas-Dayagi, Ziv, & Reis, 2009). Supporting 
this, if situational assessment indicated that 
control was achievable, officers from both sam-
ples (11 expert SFOs and 5 novice AFOs) auto-
matically reverted to tactical responses in 
accordance with SOPs (referred to as “training 
mode”). Because they require little monitoring, 
automatic responses are fast and efficient, free-
ing limited cognitive resources to consider other 
aspects of the incident (e.g., situational assess-
ment, recognition of critical cues, and adapta-
tion). Training mode was more readily utilized 
by expert SFOs than novice AFOs, although 
only up to a tipping point of a perceived imme-
diate threat to own life, which instead automati-
cally initiated defensive behavioral responses.
2c. Chunking. Seemingly endless lists of con-
siderations and simultaneously occurring events 
and tasks were described to generate an over-
whelmingly high level of perceived cognitive 
demand (referred to as “spinning plates”; 
AFO9). As a result of this overwhelming 
demand, six expert SFOs reported chunking 
(Gobet et al., 2001) the incident into separate 
tasks to be dealt with of priority. This chunking 
process helped expert SFOs identify and priori-
tize tasks, reducing cognitive demand while 
serving to highlight anomalies and tasks to be 
addressed: It increased situational awareness. 
Supporting naturalistic decision making claims 
of an expert “in-built prioritization” scheme of 
environmental cues (Seamster et al., 1993), pri-
oritized judgments were made subconsciously 
and quickly as an outcome of SFOs’ expertise. 
Novice AFOs did not report this strategy in their 
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description, indicating a discrepancy among the 
strategies across differing levels of expertise.
3. Adaptation. Armed confrontations involve 
highly dynamic and changeable threats; there-
fore, in addition to tactical proficiency to take 
immediate action (i.e., “training mode”), offi-
cers must be prepared to behaviorally adapt. All 
12 expert SFOs referred to adaptations in their 
decisions, roles, positions, and tactical actions. 
Most adaptation reported was made in response 
to situational limitations (e.g., threat to own life, 
time pressure, and resource strategies). Threat to 
own life resulted in adaptations such as sacrific-
ing speed for safety, whereas time-pressured 
adaptations included going without a preferred 
(primary) weapon or quickly implementing tac-
tics in a nonpreferred location to effect a quick 
arrest. Sometimes, this adaptive need meant 
resorting to a satisfying “best fit” option to avoid 
“worst case” outcomes.
3a. Flexibility. Through experiential knowl-
edge, SFOs were aware of the unpredictability 
of armed confrontations and could recognize 
when they needed to be flexible to changing cir-
cumstantial demands and adapt their decisions, 
roles/positions, and tactical actions accordingly 
(i.e., deciding to enter a house as a team of two, 
rather than contain it and wait for further 
resources, in accordance with policy and guide-
lines based on the intelligence of an injured vic-
tim inside). Whereas expert SFOs intuitively 
recognized a need for flexibility and imple-
mented adaptation quickly, novice AFOs relied 
more heavily on SOPs and were reluctant to 
implement change. For example, one novice 
AFO described how, following SOP guidance 
toward baton gun availability and access, he or 
she prioritized this in the recalled situation. 
However, in hindsight, this participant declared 
that he or she would not do so again based on 
experience that freedom of movement and 
speed in that situation were more advantageous 
than access to use a baton gun.
3b. Confidence. Confidence enabled expert 
SFOs to be flexible with tactics or decisions and 
to do so quickly. In contrast, novice AFOs were 
more cautious in their tactical decision making 
and reluctant to adapt, preferring to act within a 
prescribed tactical framework despite contex-
tual redundancy. Novice AFOs were able to rec-
ognize anomalies and identify when SOPs 
could no longer be adhered to under the demands 
of the armed confrontation; however, they were 
not always confident enough to adapt to these 
demands. Instead, novice AFOs dealt with their 
inexperience by seeking verification before 
implementation of a decision from a more expe-
rienced officer.
Five novice AFOs sought verification from 
an officer of higher authority or with more expe-
rience before implementing a tactical decision 
or action. This “safety net of other, more experi-
enced colleagues” (AFO1) acted as a “cushion” 
(AFO9) to verify decision making. Such verifi-
cation involved “appraising ideas” (AFO2), 
assessing response appropriateness (checking 
for glaring mistakes), and reassurance. One offi-
cer described this process through the analogy of 
a child looking to an adult for verification of her 
or his answer when learning a new word (AFO4).
Six novice AFOs acknowledged that, since 
the recalled armed confrontation, their confi-
dence had grown. This increase was described 
as a predicted behavioral change—from seeking 
verification to informing teammates of decisions 
and enforcing one’s own judgment, even if it 
contrasts the actions of a more experienced offi-
cer. Such changes were expected to involve the 
confidence to act quickly on one’s intuition, as 
opposed to waiting for instructions. These 
behavioral changes may reflect the development 
of trust in one’s adaptive decision making or 
mental modeling of skills over time.
3c. Defensive Adaptation. Upon a struggle to 
acquire control, expert SFOs’ threat perception 
was heightened, resulting in internal changes, 
recognition of a need for adaptation, and defen-
sive behavior. Eight SFOs and nine AFOs 
reported perceiving a direct threat to their lives 
at some point during the recalled incident. Per-
ceiving there to be a direct threat to life reflected 
three factors: (a) an increase in the suspect’s 
physical or verbal aggression; (b) the presence, 
perception, or presentation of a weapon; and (c) 
dangerous environmental conditions (a lack of 
ballistic or visual cover). Considerations of self-
preservation influenced positioning and tactical 
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options. Under personal threat, tactical consider-
ations (e.g., victim, containment of house, and 
public cordons) were sacrificed in favor of pri-
oritizing a “reactionary gap” (AFO8)—that is, 
enough distance between themselves and the 
suspect to enable effective defensive behavior in 
response to any potential threat posed by the 
suspect, full focus on the threat posed to self, 
and addressing that threat. Novice AFOs 
explained that without the prioritization of their 
safety, their ability to safely conduct a tactic is 
compromised. After surpassing a tipping point 
of a perceived time-critical threat to life, final 
shoot–no shoot decisions were instinctual defen-
sive responses based on a dual judgment of self-
preservation (i.e., “me or him”; SFO11), which 
took precedence over tactical objectives.
discussion
This study sought to compare the processes 
underlying the tactical decision making of expert 
SFOs and novice AFOs. Comparing these results 
highlighted similarities and differences. This 
information was consolidated into a DRT to 
synthesize and integrate the data across the two 
groups, which revealed key trends and dispari-
ties and highlighted potential areas of training 
(Table 2). Noted disparities included (a) a dif-
ference in coping with cognitive load, (b) SFOs’ 
confident implementation of intuitive decision 
making versus AFOs’ reliance on instruction 
and verification before decision implementation, 
and (c) SFOs’ recognition of situational changes 
and subsequent tactical adaptation versus AFOs’ 
reluctance to move away from SOPs despite 
their contextual irrelevance.
The results from both CTAs suggest adaptive 
flexibility to be a distinguishing factor of SFO 
expertise. SFOs are proposed to have adaptive 
expertise, which consists of the ability to (a) 
understand when and why particular procedures 
are appropriate or inappropriate; (b) recognize 
shifts in the situation that necessitate adaptability; 
(c) respond to situational cues that indicate the 
prioritization of speed and accuracy (Verschaffel 
et al., 2009); and (d) implement rapid, accurate, 
and contextually appropriate tactical changes 
(Kavanagh, 2006; Kozlowski & DeShon, 2004).
SFOs and AFOs both formed and tested men-
tal models and relied on schematic models of 
typicality for pattern and anomaly recognition 
(Klein & Hoffman, 1993). However, experience 
enabled expert SFOs to use these processes more 
flexibly in response to dynamic situational 
demands. For instance, both samples recognized 
situational cues that indicated the need for adap-
tation of SOPs in favor of more appropriate tacti-
cal actions, but expert SFOs understood the inter-
actions between the cues and the unfolding inci-
dent and responded by quickly and intuitively 
adapting appropriately. In contrast, novice AFOs 
preferred to stick with SOPs for as long as pos-
sible, even when doing so inhibited the progress 
of the incident, adapting their tactical actions 
only if faced with an immediate threat to life (in 
which case, defensive behaviors took over) or 
when doing so was verified by a more senior and 
experienced officer. This disparity may reflect a 
different reliance on perceptual and conceptual 
knowledge between the two groups. Perceptual 
knowledge, which enables recognition of critical 
environmental cues, is thought to develop much 
quicker than conceptual knowledge (the ability 
to interpret the relevance and meaning of such 
cues; Melcher & Schooler, 2004). Supporting 
this, novice AFOs were able to see when current 
SOPs were not working (perceptual knowledge), 
but they were not always able to understand how 
they could adapt to these cues (conceptual 
knowledge; Fiore et al., 2012).
The ability to flexibly transfer and apply exper- 
 iential knowledge to new contexts depends on 
the ability to recognize the underlying principles 
that govern the situation (Verschaffel et al., 
2009). For instance, as expert SFOs described, 
mental modeling reflected a process of “picture 
developing” to (a) causally connect and explain 
the situation in a meaningful way, (b) build 
expectations, (c) direct decision making, and (d) 
prepare for subsequent actions and outcomes 
(Fackler et al., 2009). Mental models (concep-
tual knowledge) not only enabled expert SFOs 
to immediately recognize contextual changes 
and when standard tactical options were failing 
in the current context (based on previously pro-
jected occurrences, outcomes, and own 
responses) but also enabled their understanding 
of how and why they could adapt their training 
or assigned role to the identified situational 
changes (Fiore et al., 2012). Both samples uti-
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lized mental modeling strategies; however, 
expert SFOs were able to quickly generate a 
larger number of hypothesized potential occur-
rences. A greater number of anticipated task-
relevant options have been found in previous 
studies to help experts predict actions and out-
comes more accurately under uncertainty, 
enabling greater flexibility to respond to pro-
jected events (Gutzwiller & Clegg, 2013; Ward, 
Ericsson, & Williams, 2013). Similarly, expert 
SFOs described mental modeling before arriv-
ing at the scene as a preparatory process that 
aided adaptation in later phases of the armed 
confrontation. In contrast, novice AFOs’ inexpe-
rience was shown in their lack of confidence and 
reliance on verification of tactical decisions 
before implementation of adaptive action.
Reflecting Rasmussen’s (1976) decision lad-
der, novice AFOs were found to respond to the 
circumstances occurring during a firearms inci-
dent in a linear process of reasoning, as com-
pared with expert SFOs, who flexibly shunt 
from cue to cue depending on the contextual 
demands (Jenkins, 2009; Naikar, 2010). The 
parallel between these findings and Rasmus-
sen’s decision ladder suggests implication for 
training recommendations.
theoretical implications
In all, the current findings complement previ-
ous models of expertise. For instance, models 
such as Klein’s RPD model (1997, 2008) indi-
cate expertise to be exemplified by a recogni-
tional shift from analytic processes toward auto-
matic intuitive response (Benner, 2004; Lipshitz 
et al., 2001). The current results support the 
gradual development of reliance on intuitive 
processes: expert SFOs reported having a “feel” 
for an incident (SFO1), which helped them 
judge priorities and tactical decisions. In addi-
tion, almost all expert SFOs reported relying 
on an automatic response that they referred 
to as “training mode,” which echoes a simple 
match process via the RPD model (Klein, 
2008). However, the data show that under 
some circumstances (low levels of time-critical 
threat; i.e., prearrival and postincident proce-
dures), experts continue to utilize analytically 
planned processing, such as compartmentaliza-
tion (e.g., “You’re kind of ticking the boxes”; 
SFO11) and mental modeling (e.g., “I always 
try and preempt the ‘what if’ factor”; SFO4). 
Therefore, the current data suggest that exper-
tise in the context of tactical decision making 
during an armed confrontation is not defined 
by either intuitive or analytic processing alone 
but rather is exemplified as the flexibility to 
adapt one’s responses quickly and confidently 
to situational changes under increased demand. 
Consequently, this study provides support for 
the RPD model (Klein, 1997, 2008), theories of 
adaptive expertise (Mercier & Higgins, 2013; 
Verschaffel et al., 2009; Wiltshire et al., 2014), 
and Rasmussen’s (1976) decision ladder, which 
similarly sees flexibility and adaptation as the 
defining characteristic of expert decision mak-
ing (Jenkins, 2009; Naikar, 2010).
practical implications
Applications to Police Policy. The current 
study presents an evidence-based framework of 
tactical decision making during armed confronta-
tions that accounts for contextual influences on 
performance. Increased general understanding of 
the complexities involved in AFO decision mak-
ing during armed confrontations may similarly 
improve public trust in the accountability of 
police decision making around the use of fire-
arms. Although it is currently unclear whether the 
attentional capacities of AFOs can be improved, 
an awareness of the limitations of attentional pro-
cesses in high-demand situations is crucial, both 
for the AFOs themselves and for those investigat-
ing their responses (Kavanagh, 2006).
Police Training. The comparative results of 
both CTAs highlight adaptive flexibility to be 
associated with firearms expertise; therefore, it is 
suggested that police firearms training could 
enforce adaptive expertise more strongly to 
enhance AFO flexibility to changing task 
demands under high-stress conditions. Cognitive 
transformation theory claims that the develop-
ment of adaptive expertise depends on pattern 
recognition, perceptual discrimination, under-
standing of the interconnections of knowledge, 
and the ability to modify knowledge to the specif-
ics of situation or domain (Klein & Baxter, 2009; 
Wiltshire et al., 2014). Therefore, to promote 
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adaptive expertise, development of the following 
is recommended: mental models (Gutzwiller & 
Clegg, 2013; Klein & Militello, 2001; Pirolli & 
Card, 2005; Ward et al., 2013), sense-making 
skills to recognize conflict between mental mod-
els and current situational cues (Fiore et al., 2012; 
Morrison, Wiggins, Bond, & Tyler, 2013), and 
the ability to revise or reject mental models in 
response to situational assessment (Ando, Kida, 
& Oda, 2002;  Wiltshire et al., 2014).
Speculatively, this may be accomplished by 
systematically exposing AFOs to a variety of 
scenarios where, through guided practice and 
feedback, they can develop the models of typi-
cality necessary for rapid and accurate situation 
assessment and anomaly recognition (Fiore et al., 
2012). Exposure to high-fidelity “worst case” 
armed confrontation simulations involving situa-
tions that cannot be solved through traditional 
methods (tactical SOPs) may encourage adaptive 
flexibility to complete the exercise (Ando et al., 
2002; Williams & Westall, 2003). Future research 
is needed to fully examine how the acceleration 
of adaptive expertise can be implemented in 
practice, and any implementations should be 
fully evaluated to assess their effectiveness.
limitations
As previously discussed, because of the auto-
maticity and therefore often unconscious nature 
of expert decision making, experts in particular 
may find it difficult to articulate any intuitive 
processes via interviewing techniques (Feldon, 
2010; Smink et al., 2012; Tofelgrehl & Feldon, 
2013). Whereas CTA has been shown to succeed 
in extracting up to 43% more decision-based 
performance-relevant information from experts 
than standard interview protocols (Clark & 
Estes, 1996), it must be acknowledged that as 
a form of interview methodology, CTA is likely 
to suffer from the same limitations in terms of 
extraction of intuition. However, the publication 
and high citation of reports that utilize inter-
view methods such as CTA for the extraction of 
expert intuition in a variety of decision making 
environments (i.e., Benner, 2004; Klein, 1997; 
Wong & Blandford, 2002) support the use of 
interview methods for the study of expertise
The length of time passed between the inci-
dent and expert SFOs’ recall was substantial in 
some cases and therefore could present a meth-
odological issue; however, the recall of unveri-
fied retrospective events must be considered as a 
possible limitation of both CTAs. Previous stud-
ies have used the CDM technique to interview 
participants regarding the decisions made during 
an observed event (Brezovic, Klein, & Thord-
sen, 1990). Therefore, to combat the possibility 
of memory fragility in the recall of unverified 
 retrospective armed confrontations, a follow-up 
study is proposed to examine the decisional pro-
cesses occurring during the completion of a 
recorded firearms training exercise.
It should be noted that analysis is based on 
only 23 participants, all recruited from a fire-
arms department within the same British police 
force. Although it is acknowledged that gener-
alizability is a shortcoming, AFOs are a specific 
group of decision makers, and as such, general-
ization to a larger population is not a major con-
sideration, as findings are to be applied to these 
particular decision makers (McAndrew & Gore, 
2013; Roth et al., 2010). More relevant, it is 
possible that these results represent force-spe-
cific novice AFO and expert SFO tactical deci-
sion making, and a larger sample generated 
across UK-wide forces could help decipher the 
generalization of these findings to UK AFO tac-
tical decision making more accurately (Smick 
et al., 2012). Nonetheless, given the limited 
time available and difficulties in gaining access 
to such a specialized group of officers, this was 
not possible. Future research may seek to clar-
ify these issues through replication with officers 
across different forces to examine relationships 
and whether they exist in different policing 
areas.
conclusion
Similar processes were reported across the 
two groups, whereas strategies used, tactical 
implementation, and confidence differed. Expert 
SFOs had a great deal of experiential knowledge. 
With this knowledge, expert SFOs were able to 
(a) categorize incidents, (b) recognize anoma-
lies, (c) have awareness of and be able to quickly 
adapt to the dynamic environment, (d) use their 
training unconsciously and automatically, and 
(e) demonstrate confidence in their abilities. 
Confidence in one’s ability enabled expert SFOs 
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to utilize experiential strategies that freed cog-
nitive resources, affording implementation of 
adaptive tactical decisions and actions assessed 
through mental modeling. Novice AFO com-
parison highlighted the gradual development of 
confidence in one’s own ability. These findings 
can be implemented into AFO training, thereby 
highlighting the importance of these cognitive 
processes as a contributor to expert tactical deci-
sion making during firearms incidents.
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